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Communication, Public Opinion, 
and Democracy: New Challenges 
 
Abstract 
This essay addresses the relationship between communication, 
public opinion, and democracy, which is evident in Athenian 
democracy. It briefly considers the complexity of the concept of 
public opinion, and how it was understood as a political 
phenomenon accepted in general thinking and political action, as 
a consequence of the democratic dynamism originated by the 
printing press. After briefly considering some of the most relevant 
ideas about this relationship throughout the 19th century, this 
essay discusses the main attitudes that emerged in the face of 
public opinion after the First World War, from which the most 
relevant theories about the effects of media on opinion, 
behaviours, and action begun to be developed. The study takes 
into account the development of an empirical science of public 
opinion, linked to scientific opinion surveys. It summarises how 
the investigation of the effects of the media goes through a stage in 
which they are considered irrelevant, until some studies –
especially the theories of agenda setting and the spiral of silence– 
recovered the idea of the powerful effects of the media. Finally, the 
essay addresses the new challenges posed by the disenchantment 
with democracy, the loss of credibility of the media, and the way of 
understanding communication, at a time in which digital 
technology has facilitated the creation of social media, causing a 
situation described as the post-truth era, in which the global need 
for information becomes more evident. The new challenges affect 
the political science, research on public opinion, and the science 
of communication, which requires a foundation of greater 
consistency than the current one. 
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1. Introduction 
The obvious and close relationship between communication, public 
opinion, and democracy has had diverse manifestations throughout 
history. Currently, it represents a complex scenery. Athenian democracy, a landmark when 
we talk about democracy, had a numerical limit imposed by the possibilities of 
communication. The important aspect, when the assembly of the citizens of Athens took place 
in the Pnyx Hill, was to be able to hear, speak, and be heard: the scope of the human voice 
defined the dimensions of the polis. That primitive democracy showed that “participation is, 
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clearly, the proper avenue of approach to the study of public opinion, for, in various senses, 
public opinion is participating opinion” (Wilson, 1962, p. 7). Price has underlined that, taking 
into account its links with the processes of discussion, debate, and collective decision-
making, “public opinion remains fundamentally a communication concept,” although it is 
approached from a philosophical, political, and sociological or psychological perspective 
(1992, p. 91). 
From a broad perspective, public opinion has an ancient existence (Holtzendorff, 1879). 
However, the intellectual and academic awareness of this phenomenon with diffuse contours, 
which has aroused and continues to arouse enthusiasm and suspicion, was developed in the 
last centuries. Although the circumstances have changed, some theoretical problems are 
renewed, sometimes with few variations. 
2. The concept and name of public opinion 
Undoubtedly, the notion of public opinion has problematic aspects. Bryce, a great enthusiast 
of the American system, which he considered to be the genuine popular regime or a regime 
of public opinion, and to whom we owe an ‘orthodox democratic theory,’ understood it as a 
“vague, fluctuating, complex thing... omnipotent yet indeterminate, a sovereign to whose 
voice everyone listens, yet whose words, because he speaks with as many tongues as the waves 
of a boisterous sea, it is so hard to catch” (1995, II, p. 929). This author briefly defined it as “the 
aggregate of the views men hold regarding matters that affect or interest the community” only 
in his later work “Modern Democracies” (1923, vol. I, chap. XV, p. 153). At the beginning of the 
20th century, Oncken defined it as “a Proteus, a being that appears simultaneously in a 
thousand guises, both visible and as a phantom, impotent and surprisingly efficacious” (1914, 
cited by Noelle-Neumann, 1983, p. 59). Public opinion, “one of the most interdisciplinary 
concepts in social science” (Donsbach & Traugott, 2008), continues to be “one of the most 
nebulous concepts in democratic theory” (Herbst, 2011, p. 302). 
Although there are precedents of the expression ‘public opinion’ in Cicero’s writings, in 
the John de Salisbury’s ‘Policráticus’ (1159), or in the essays of Michel de Montaigne, it was not 
incorporated into the political, academic, and popular language until the end of the 18th 
century. In Great Britain, the expression ‘the opinion of the people’ was used to refer to the 
voice of the people relating to political affairs (Gunn, 1983, p. 261), whereas ‘public opinion’ 
was used to indicate how the opinion of others could condition personal behaviour, as 
proposed by Locke when dealing with the law of opinion or reputation (1690, p. 475): human 
beings, due to fear of isolation, are forced into conformity by fearing the court of opinion. 
Anyway, although the research places England as the cradle of the concept of public opinion 
(Gunn, 1983, 1995), the notion in continental Europe was consolidated in France, with Necker’s 
writings and politics, who was minister of Louis XVI (López-Escobar, 2008), although it had 
also been used by Rousseau in France, or Von Müller in Germany (Noelle-Neumann, 1984, p. 
251). 
3. Printing press and democracy 
The interrelation that we are considering became relevant in a special way with the invention 
of the printing press. Gutenberg’s invention progressively changed the way in which 
Europeans shared information, ideas, and opinions. This fact allowed the creation of 
illustrated elites that shaped a ‘society of publics’ (Tarde, 1969). As Carlyle wrote, “printing, 
which comes necessarily out of Writing... is equivalent to Democracy: invent Writing, 
Democracy is inevitable” (1959, p. 21). 
The influence and power of the press in general –and later newspapers– and its 
connection with public opinion, became commonplace, at least in the Western world, 
although that connection was seen with optimistic or cautious eyes. Bryce (1995) referred to 
“the journalists, whose business is to discover what people are thinking” (II, p. 910). On the 
Carballo, M., López-Escobar, E. & McCombs, M. 
Communication, Public Opinion, and Democracy: New Challenges 
ISSN 2386-7876 – © 2018 Communication & Society, 31(4), 121-134 
123 
other hand, he also referred to “the man who tries to lead public opinion, be he statesman 
journalist or lecturer,” to conclude that “the largest part of the work of forming opinion is 
done by these men” (II, p. 914). 
4. Public opinion and illustration 
It has been pointed out that “both historians who have written about ‘the supremacy of public 
opinion,’ and those who have written about the naissance d’un monstre (Fay, 1965) have agreed 
that, at the end of the 18th century and in the early 19th century, there have been changes in 
Western Europe and other places that marked the arrival of public opinion as a significant 
force” (Gunn, 1983, p. 260). In the 1750s and 1760s, “politics broke out of the absolutist mold” 
(Baker, 1990, p. 24-25), and the opinion “villain of philosophy, became public opinion, hero of 
politics” (Peters 1995, p. 6). 
The Encyclopedie, published in 1765, included the term ‘opinion’ –in the Logic section– 
but not the expression ‘public opinion’ (Kaufman, 2004, p. 91). This expression appeared in 
1789 in the Encyclopedie Mehodique (cited by Baker, 1990, p. 161), which disregarded the term 
‘opinion’ in the philosophical sections, and introduced the term ‘opinion publique’ in the 
section dedicated to the topics of public administration. As Baker states, “within the space of 
a generation, the flickering lamp of ‘opinion’ has been transformed into the unremitting light 
of ‘public opinion,’ the light of the universal tribunal before which citizens and governments 
alike must now appear” (1990, p. 168). ‘Opinion’ became ‘public opinion’, “not a social function 
but a political category, the ‘tribunal du public,’ the court of final appeal for monarchical 
authority, as for its critics.” With the Revolution in France, “the sacred centre was 
symbolically refigured; the public person of the sovereign was displaced by the sovereign 
person of the public; lèse-nation was substituted for lèse-majesté” (Baker, 1990, p. 9). 
The conception of public opinion as a court, superior to royalty, was a key idea for 
authors of the late 18th century and early 19th century. Necker, fascinated by ‘l’empire de 
l’opinion publique,’ underlined its power and reign ‘sur tous les esprits’ (1784, p. 49). This author 
considered it as “une puissance invisible, qui, sans trésors, san garde et sans armée” (1784, p. 
50), promulgating laws that were obeyed in the same royal palace; and also as “a tribunal oú 
tous les hommes qui attirent sur eux des regards, son obligés de comparoître” (2003 [1820], p. 
47-50; López-Escobar, 2008). 
During the same period, Bentham –to whom according to Palmer we owe “the first 
detailed discussion of public opinion in English” (1953, p. 8)– referred to public opinion as a 
court that “unites all the wisdom and all justice of the nation”, even if it was not protected 
from corruption. Its ‘Constitutional Code; For the Use of All Nations and All Governments 
Professing Liberal Opinions’ converted it into a constitutional power; “he insisted upon the 
importance of public opinion as an instrument of social control; and in his more specifically 
political treatises, compiled after 1814, he regarded the free expression of public opinion as 
the chief safeguard against misrule and as the characteristic mark of a democratic state” 
(Palmer, 1953, p. 8). He also considered ‘the newspaper’ as the most important factor in the 
formation and expression of public opinion. The press was not only an “appropriate organ of 
the Public Opinion Tribunal, but the only constantly acting visible one” (Bentham, 1995, p. 579). 
The interrelation between the first ‘mass communication media’ –the periodical press– 
public opinion and democracy became evident throughout the 19th century. Mackinnon, who 
considered public opinion as a result of the accumulation of capital and the consolidation of 
the middle classes, and in his work highlighted “On the rise, progress, and present state of 
public opinion in Great Britain, and other parts of the world” (1828) stated: “It is evident that 
public opinion gains strength in proportion to the facility of communication”. Mackinnon 
refers to the means by which information is disseminated (1828, p. 10-21) and in particular to 
the ease with which “every sort of information is distributed in every direction, by means of 
the press”. This author states “To dwell on the powerful and irresistible way of conveying 
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information by means of the press, and of the immense influence it has in promotion of the 
formation of public opinion, would be useless; it must be evident to everyone that, by this 
means, the information and almost the civilisation of the community is established.” 
Certainly, not all authors of the time understood public opinion as the spontaneous voice 
of the people. Comte tried to resolve the intellectual, moral, and political anarchy observed in 
France in the early 19th century using a ‘science of the social aggregate,’ whose essential 
elements would be the reorganisation of opinions and traditions (opinions et moeurs). As this 
author developed this germinal idea, his goal of achieving uniformity of opinions and 
traditions became more evident. In the set of his works, and especially in his Discours sur 
l’ensemble du positivisme, published after the 1848 revolution (1907), and in his Système de 
politique positive, or Traité de sociologie, instituant la religion de l’humanité (T. I., p. 821 [851-
1854]), Comte places “l’opinion publique au centre de sa vaste theorie et de la politique qu’il 
en déduit”, assigning it a fundamental regulatory role in society (Reynié, 2007, p. 95), but in a 
contrary sense to that of many of his contemporaries (López-Escobar, 2014). 
Throughout the 19th century, the study of public opinion was consolidated as a result of 
the organisation of masses of people that wished to express their political demands, “and 
mass opinion became recognised as a powerful force of government” (Wilson, 1962, p. 73). 
Those who wrote in newspapers, political leaders who wrote their speeches, and academics 
and intellectuals were contributing, perhaps unknowingly, to setting up a new discipline, in 
which public opinion was intertwined with the expansion of democracy and the action of the 
media, even though the judgments were discrepant. 
De Tocqueville, for whom democracy was something providential, an indication of a 
progress wanted by the Creator (De la démocratie en Amérique), warned about the possibility 
of establishing a tyranny of public opinion and the risk that all newspapers informed in a 
redundant manner. Fifty years later, Bryce distinguished “three stages in the evolution of 
opinion from its unconscious and passive into its conscious and active condition.” This author 
imagined a fourth degree in which the opinion “would not only reign but govern” (1995 [1888], 
p. 919). He observed mechanical difficulties for its continuous action. However, in spite of it, 
he considered that the governors had a ‘reflexive’ behaviour of what they supposed to be 
public opinion; they behaved as if they knew it. 
5. Consequences of the First World Word 
The enlightened ideal of rationality began to be broken with the ‘discovery’ and study of the 
Freudian ‘unconscious,’ and with the tragedy of the First World War. The notion of the 
unconscious was underlined by Le Bon in his ‘Psychologie des foules’ (1895): 
La raison est chose trop neuve dans l’humanité, et trop imparfaite encore pour pouvoir 
nous révéler les lois de l’inconscient et surtout le remplacer. Dans tous nos actes la part 
de l’inconscient est immense et celle de la raison très petite. L’inconscient agit comme 
une force encore inconnue. 
Referring to the media, limited at that time to the press, Le Bon affirmed that opinions 
que nous croyons si libres, nous sont données par le milieu, les libres, les journaux, et 
suivant nos sentiments héréditaires, nous les acceptons ou les rejetons en bloc, mai les 
plus souvent sans que la raison ait une part quelcoque dans cette acceptation, ou ce reject. 
(1898, p. 80). 
He considered that, with an omnipotent press at its service, public opinion became 
dominant, and “dictated its judgments to judges, and wars and alliances to governments.” 
Reflecting later on the war, public opinion seemed to him a considerable but rarely 
spontaneous force, and for that reason the relationships between the powers included the 
alteration of the truth in order to act on it (1915, p. 23). 
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The First World War modified, in facts and thoughts, the interrelation between 
democracy, communication, and public opinion. There were not only some fundamental 
principles of psychology changed, but, during the war, there was mass use of propaganda 
characterised by the participation of qualified journalists. The Soviet Union, established 
during the war, turned propaganda into a fundamental tool of its system; however, other 
countries, in particular the United States, also used it in a decisive manner. 
At the end of the conflict, the theoretical consideration of the relationships between the 
political system, public opinion, and the mass media adopted different forms. Weber showed 
his rejection of the influences exerted on the government “by the so-called ‘public opinion’ –
that is, concerted action born of irrational’ sentiments’ and usually staged or directed by party 
bosses or the press” (Weber, 1978, vol. II, p. 980). Lippmann (1922), based on his personal 
observations, highlighted the crisis of journalism as a consequence of the replacement of 
information by propaganda, and reflected on the needs that arose in a much more complex 
new society, a world to which citizens did not have direct access. He coined the notion of 
‘stereotype,’ through which public opinion was constituted, and considered that the ideal of 
the omnicompetent citizen of the ‘orthodox theory’ of democracy was false and unattainable 
(1993 [1925], p. 39). 
Contemporaneously, Tönnies wrote a dense reflection in which he appealed to the 
responsibility of the intellectuals to contribute to the formation of public opinion (1922). In 
contrast to Lippmann, Bernays decided to apply what he had learned in the war during the 
new peace period. In the first words of his book ‘Propaganda’ (1928), he expressed his 
conviction that: 
The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the 
masses is an important element in democratic society. Those who manipulate this unseen 
mechanism of society constitute an invisible government which is the true ruling power 
of our country. 
Bernays proposed that propagandists –who he considered experts in public relations 
(1923)– were not only able to create news, but could create ‘facts.’ It is not surprising that, 
forty years later, in his work ‘The image’ –a later edition was subtitled ‘Guide for pseudo-
events in the United States’– Boorstin (1962) wrote about the tangle of unreality that had been 
forged in his country, and considered public opinion as a type of pseudo-event, provided that 
its measurement was made with the primary purpose of informing about it. 
On a more strictly academic level, and largely as a result of Lasswell’s (1927) research on 
the propaganda technique during the First World War, the ‘magic bullet’ or ‘hypodermic 
needle’ model was established. The model affirmed that the media had very powerful and 
immediate effects on public opinion. 
6. Empirical study of public opinion 
During the fifty years prior to 1930, the most notable theorists were not only interested in the 
process of public opinion, but also in the ethics and significance of that process (Albig, 1957, p. 
21). However, from then on, certain things happened that altered the trend. These facts 
included the consolidation of scientific surveys, and the launch of ‘Public Opinion Quarterly’ 
(1937), in whose first issue Allport proposed the creation of a new (empirical) science of public 
opinion. 
Gallup, along with Roper and Crossley, was a pioneer in this field. He argued that the 
surveys were the answer to the political dream of the fourth phase of the popular government, 
or the public opinion imagined by Bryce. With the surveys, the study of public opinion started 
to be “a glorified kind of fortunetelling into a practical way of learning what the nation thinks” 
(Gallup & Rae, 1940, p. 5). 
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Taking into account that several academic fields had been interested in public opinion, 
and had contributed to its study (specifically psychology, history, statistics, social psychology, 
advertising, journalism, and politics), Public Opinion Quarterly emerged to coordinate and 
integrate that knowledge, and was conceived “to serve as a clearing house for contributions 
from different fields relating to various phases of the study of public opinion” (cf. Childs, 1957, 
p. 8), although, in fact, “the aspects of public opinion which soon came to receive major 
emphasis were opinion surveys and mass media” (Childs, 1957, p. 11). 
These lines of studies were enhanced by the development of empirical research that, 
during the Second World War, the U.S. government entrusted to psychologists, political 
scientists, and sociologists interested in the processes of change of opinion –Hovland, 
Lazarsfeld and Lasswell among them. The concentration on empirical research explains why, 
ten years after the creation of Public Opinion Quarterly, and shortly after the creation of the 
American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR, 1947) and the World Association 
for Public Opinion Research (WAPOR ), Blumer criticised what he considered a statistical drift 
and a conceptual narrowing of public opinion (1948). 
Berelson analysed the changes that occurred in the study of public opinion, comparing a 
selection of texts, some representatives of the classical tradition, and others published from 
1939 to 1953. This comparison led him to underline the revolutionary change in the study on 
public opinion, which had become more technical and quantitative, making the above 
considerations practically archaic. Whereas prior to the consolidation of scientific surveys 
historians, theorists, and philosophers had paid scholarly attention to the phenomenon of 
public opinion, it had then moved to a new way of working, in which “teams of technicians do 
research projects on specific subjects and report findings. Twenty years ago the study of 
public opinion was art of scholarship; today it is part of science” (Berelson, 1956, p. 304-305). 
It was enough to analyse the content of Public Opinion Quarterly during those decades to see 
how the theory had been “outstripped by description,” and how the “interest in manipulation 
seems to have crowded out attention to the values fundamental to our democracy” (Albig, 1957, 
p. 14). 
7. From minimal to powerful effects 
The changes in the way of studying public opinion led to a revision of the theory of the 
powerful effects of the media, based on the well-known investigations promoted by the 
Austrian researcher Lazarsfeld, especially on the occasion of the presidential elections of 1940 
(Erie county) and 1948 (Elmira county). Such studies suggested that, in the political sphere, 
opinions were basically stable and that the mass media did not exert a decisive influence on 
them. On the other hand, when the detailed observations of study of Elmira (Berelson, 
Lazarsfeld & McPhee, 1954) were published, the authors added a chapter to explain that 
democracy did not work according to the assumptions of ‘orthodox theory’. In the academic 
field, such results oriented attention towards opinion leadership and personal influence (Katz, 
1966), promoting the two-step flow theory. At the political level, these studies influenced the 
planning and development of electoral campaigns, a decisive moment in any democratic 
system. 
These investigations and others that were conducted in different moments, spaces, and 
contexts seemed to contradict the popular and academic expectations that arose during the 
First World War, given that there was little evidence of the effects of mass communication on 
behaviours and opinions. Twenty years after the research in Eire County, Klapper –who in 
1949 had already prepared a report for the Bureau of Applied Social Research– based on the 
analysis of the available literature, proposed a new approach to the effects of mass 
communication: the theory of minimal or limited effects, basically reinforcing the opinions 
(1960). 
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Such an approach took root in the thinking of researchers and professionals until the 
theories of cultivation (Gerbner), the ‘agenda setting’ function of the media (McCombs & 
Shaw), and the ‘spiral of silence’ (Noelle-Neumann) forced scholars to reconsider the 
influence exerted by the media on citizens’ opinions and behaviours. Gerbner and his 
colleagues investigated the effects in the medium and long term by studying entertainment 
programs, and preferentially focusing on violence. The other lines of research worked with 
news. 
7.1. The agenda setting function of mass media 
The central tenet of the agenda setting theory is the transfer of salience from one agenda to 
another. It has been inspired by Lippmann’s ‘Public Opinion.’ Lippmann emphasised the 
importance of the press in shaping public opinion, particularly in his notion of ‘pseudo-
environment,’ which states that human beings are not reactive to the real world but to the 
world presented to them by the news media. “The world we have to deal with politically is out 
of reach, out of sight, out of mind” (1922, p. 29). The title of the first chapter of Public Opinion 
is “The world outside and the pictures in our heads”, and the media are the bridge. This theory 
has decisively contributed to leave up the minimal media effects approach. The agenda setting 
role of the media links journalism and its tradition of storytelling to the arena of public 
opinion, a relationship with considerable consequences for society. 
McCombs and Shaw conducted their first study, now known as the origin of the agenda 
setting theory, in Chapel Hill during the 1968 U.S. presidential election. They focused on 
undecided voters on the assumption that, being interested in the election, but undecided 
about their vote, would be the most open to media influence. To confirm the findings of the 
Chapel Hill study, they conducted a second research with a representative sample of all voters 
and content analysis of their news media during the summer and autumn of 1972 (McCombs, 
2014). 
Since then, the agenda setting theory has evolved, widening its scope, improving its 
methodology, and being considered a very effective theoretical framework to analyse the 
influence of media content on the public. There was an article in the inaugural issue of The 
Agenda Setting Journal that assessed the trends in agenda setting research from 1972 to 2015. 
The authors found 451 articles published in English and, certainly, a great number published 
in Spanish, German, Chinese, and other languages (Kim, Kim & Zhou, 2017). Agenda setting 
has become one of the best theories of communication research. It is approaching 50 years, 
and has generated a significant amount of empirical studies. The theory can be applied in 
about any country that has a reasonably open political system (if elections matter in those 
countries), and where the press –or at least part of it– is an open system, i.e., it is not under 
the thumbnail of the government or a dominant political party. The vitality of the agenda 
setting theory is also evident in the progress of various methodologies that, obviously, were 
not used in the original study. 
At the beginning, in its first level, the agenda setting theory addressed how the salience 
of objects transfers from the media agenda to the public agenda. Subsequently, it extended its 
analysis to the attributes, taking into account that any object had attributes, characteristics. 
That meant the incorporation of a second level, although the analysis procedures were 
identical for both levels. More recently, it has been widened to include a third level known as 
the ‘network agenda setting’ (Guo & McCombs, 2016). 
The network analysis perspective shows how issues or other objects and their attributes 
are talked about in relation with others. Asserts that these issues or other objects and their 
attributes can be either implicitly or explicitly linked in news coverage or the public’s mind. 
Third level agenda setting is more like a ‘gestalt’ focused on how the elements in messages 
are connected to each other. In terms of how Lippmann explains the pictures in our heads, 
the first level asks what are the pictures about, the second level asks what are the dominant 
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characteristics in these pictures and the third level is getting closer to the idea of what the 
picture is. 
The theory has evolved with a coherent vocabulary, which gives unity to all the studies 
in the field, and notions such as the need for orientation (Weaver, 1977), the intermediate 
agenda (which takes for granted journalists tend to look around to see what other journalists 
are reporting about), or the agenda melding (Shaw et al., 1999). The last one illustrates how 
audiences pick and choose among different media agendas in an active way. The core 
hypothesis of agenda melding is that distinctly identifiable audiences value issues and 
attributes in different manners. Obviously, each of these audiences melds agendas from 
various media into a comfortable, but different, mix of issues and attributes (Vargo et al., 2014). 
As it is well known, the notion of framing, very close to the second level of agenda setting 
analysis have lost visibility, because the notion has become blurred (Cacciatore, Scheufele & 
Iyengar, 2016), in spite of its utility in underlining that, in any case, facts and their details are 
selected with a different level of consciousness with possible purposes and consequences. 
The agenda setting theory, which along with the spiral of silence theory served to 
demonstrate the real media effects after a period of stagnant acceptation of the minimal 
media effects, not only served to this last approach, but has opened a wide path to analyse and 
understand the influence of any medium, including the social media. As a matter of fact, some 
studies have been conducted regarding this new field (Vargo et al., 2014). 
The notion of ‘need for information’, particularly relevant in the new panorama of 
communication technology, sheds light to investigate whether the loss of confidence in the 
media is related to citizens’ personal experiences (obtrusiveness), searching other sources, 
with the consequence of a lower level of agenda setting effects. In any political system, but 
basically in a democracy, citizens are not a whiteboard passively waiting for the action of the 
media upon them; they use the media when they need information about something that is of 
interest for them and cannot be known by personal experience. 
7.2. The theory of the spiral of silence 
When Bryce published his reflections on public opinion, he pointed out that popular 
governments or governments of public opinion were exposed to two dangers: the first “is the 
difficulty in ascertaining the will of the majority” (1995 [1888], p. 920); and the second “is that 
minorities may not sufficiently assert themselves.” Consequently, the power of the majorities 
grows as the minority retreats and renounces the struggle; the minority “loses faith in its 
cause and in itself, and allows its voice to be silenced by the triumphant cries of its opponents” 
(1995 [1888], p. 921). 
The theory of the spiral of silence proposed by Noelle-Neumann in the early 1970s of the 
last century, after detecting a band-wagon effect in the German elections of 1972, confirmed 
Bryce’s warning. Noelle-Neumann described the process in which a more voiced opinion 
seemed to be stronger than it really was as a spiral of silence, in such a way that it ended up 
dominating the public scene, whereas the opinion that appeared as a minority was publicly 
extinguished. This theory assumes that individuals adjust their behaviours and opinions to 
what they consider to be the majority due to fear of isolation. Mass communication intervenes 
in this process by influencing the perceptions that the public have about the dominant idea, 
in such a way that citizens’ perception may not correspond with reality. Those who compose 
the minority tend to silence their opinions in public, and the minority group will seem 
increasingly weak because of the fear of expressing themselves in public. As a consequence, 
the opinion that seems to belong to the majority would become predominant and even a social 
norm. 
Subsequent studies highlighted the fact that there were two sources to obtain 
information about the distribution of opinions, namely: direct observation of reality; and the 
observation of its representation through coverage of news media. Regarding the questions 
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that remain outside the immediate personal sphere, citizens are almost totally dependent on 
the mass media, both in terms of the facts and the perception of the climate of opinion 
(Noelle-Neumann, 1974, p. 51). 
The theory of the spiral of silence highlighted the existence of a dual climate of opinion 
when analysing the change of opinion that occurred in the German elections of 1976, in which 
there was a conscious struggle against the spiral of silence. The research, which confirmed 
the influence of the media, showed that the change of opinion had been perceived by those 
who observed the environment through television, whereas those who observed it directly 
had not perceived any change (Noelle-Neumann, 1993, p. 161). The spiral of silence against the 
real distribution of opinion could occur because the coverage of the issues contested by news 
media tends to be consonant and cumulative (Noelle-Neumann, 1973). 
8. New challenges 
At the end of the 20th century, the disenchantment with the concrete way in which democracy 
functioned, and the loss of credibility of the mass media became evident: both The American 
Society of Newspapers Editors and The Associated Press Managers and Editors Association 
promoted studies in 1985 to face the credibility gap and regain the trust of the readers. As a 
result of the trends that showed a new complexity in the relationship between 
communication, public opinion, and democracy, initiatives such as civic journalism, surveys 
with prior deliberation, and experiences of deliberative democracy emerged. 
Civic, public, or community journalism, promoted by information professionals, 
journalism teachers, and some foundations, began in 1989 (Rosen, 1999, p. 262-263). It was 
determined what should be done to make democracy work and what the media could do to 
achieve it. The suggestion was to look for a genuine ‘public agenda,’ considering it as 
something beyond “a market for information, an audience for spectacle, or a pollster’s 
random sample” (1999, p. 75). The media, particularly journalists, should not be limited to offer 
the frames of the contestants, but the framing (or frames) of the citizens. Rosen stated that 
journalism should not be considered as a business, and that “is best understood as one of the 
arts of democracy” (1999, p. 295). 
The deliberative polling initiative proposed to perform surveys that ceased to be a 
numerical count of immediate answers to common simple questions given by isolated 
individuals. The surveys would differ from the usual ones, because while they said what the 
public thinks –even if the public was not thinking too much, or barely paying attention– a 
survey with prior deliberation would show what they would think if they had a better 
opportunity to consider the matters. The original idea (Fishkin, 1995) proposed the use of 
television and the investigation of public opinion in a different way, supposedly in a more 
constructive manner. The aim at the end of the 20th century was to recover deliberative 
democracy. For Fishkin, the type of democracy achieved with technology at the end of the 
century, by operating in a social context that did not allow “a real collective deliberation on 
complex issues” was more reminiscent of the Spartan model than the Athenian ideal (1995, p. 
24). For that reason, this author proposed a different form of democracy, in which dialogue 
would have been recovered and could give life to the synthesis of communication and 
democracy. That was an approach that faced undoubted technical and economic difficulties, 
but that had allowed the accumulation of some experiences (Fishkin, 2009, p. 96-97). 
A further step in the process of recovering communication in democracy, i.e., citizens’ 
participation and dialogue, was the initiative of deliberative democracy (empowered 
deliberative democracy) focused on concrete problems with the intervention of ordinary 
citizens, who contribute with their talent, common sense, and experiences to the debate in 
order to find solutions. Fung and Wright (1999) suggested that deliberative democracy offered 
more advantages for decision-making than the procedures proposed in the programs of 
political parties, or that were the consequence of pressure exerted by interest groups on the 
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members of the legislative bodies, or that were influenced by the action of social movements 
that intended to create a set of concrete interests in the collective consciousness, or were the 
result of a negotiations, which ended up averaging the differences between the positions that 
intervened in those negotiations. 
Careful surveys performed in diverse environments (Eurobarometer, Latinobarometer, 
World Values Survey, etc.) showed the disenchantment with democracy and the loss of 
credibility of the mass media in the transition to the 21st century. However, the surveys, closely 
linked to democracies, because what counted was the voice of the people (Carballo & Hjelmar, 
2008), also lost credit on the occasion of the British referendum on Brexit and the U.S. 
presidential elections of 2016. 
Democracy, the most successful political idea in the 20th century and “one of the most 
potent political symbols in the world today” (Fung & Wright, 1999) loses appeal precisely in 
the historical moment in which there is a general trend to its establishment or restoration. 
Few individuals argue that democracy is not the best form of government; however, the way 
it works satisfies less and less (Minogue, 2010), and public confidence in democratic 
institutions, particularly parliament and political parties, continues to weaken (Carballo, 
2017). 
In the same way that the technology of printing gradually transformed political systems 
towards democracy, the new digital technology is changing the way in which citizens 
disseminate and share their ideas, public opinion is formed, and democracy manifests itself. 
In recent decades, the development of new technology has erased the boundaries between 
the media (Chaffee & Metzger, 2001). Both mass media –now called legacy media– and social 
media, although indispensable in current democratic societies, are implicated in the 
weakening of that trust due to various reasons. The legacy media were already facing a 
financial, professional, and identity crisis caused by the new technology of digital 
communication before the emergence of the most relevant social media: for example, 
Facebook in 2004, YouTube in 2005, and Twitter in 2006. 
The results of the British referendum on Brexit and the U.S. elections of 2016 caused great 
perplexity, and continue to provoke a heated debate about the origin and truthfulness of 
messages in the democracy of our time. The Oxford Dictionaries announced that the word of 
the year 2016 was post-truth, a word “relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective 
facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal 
belief” (d’Ancona, 2017). Shortly after, the discussion about ‘fake news’ and ‘fake news media’ 
encouraged the Collins Dictionary to declare the expression fake news as a word of the year 
2017, defining it as “false and sometimes sensationalist information presented as fact and 
published and spread on the Internet.” The issue had an international scope as evidenced by 
the approval of the “Joint declaration on freedom of expression and fake news, disinformation 
and propaganda” (Vienna, March 2017) by people representing the United Nations, the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Organisation of American 
States (OAS), and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) (2017). In 
addition, in January 2018, the European Union constituted a “High level experts group on fake 
news and online disinformation,” which last May presented the report “A multi-dimensional 
approach to disinformation” (2018). However, it is still a problematic issue, given that its 
regulation makes one fear that there will be an Orwellian style ‘Ministry of Truth’. In turn, the 
complex debate about facts and fact checking raises new problems of transparency and 
reliability. 
At the beginning of the 21st century, it was proposed that we were facing a neo-democracy 
(Dean, 2002, p. 170) or a post-democracy (Stalder, 2018). Currently, several countries of 
mature democracies are discussing whether democracy has died (Buffin de Chosal, 2014), or 
what type of crisis is happening, and whether there are remedies for it (Runciman, 2018; 
Mounk, 2018). In the diagnosis of the crisis, Piketty (2014) associates it with the inequality 
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created at the international level by a capitalist globalisation; however, there are still no 
answers on how to overcome it. It would be pretentious to affirm that we have solutions for a 
problem as intricate as the present one, which cannot only be explained by economic reasons, 
but which requires taking into account the evolution of cultural factors (Carballo, 2017). 
Almost ninety years ago, Lippmann (1931, p. 161) wrote something that seemed to 
prophesy the situation currently faced by information professionals: 
The working journalist today is confronted, it seems to me, with a double and cumulative 
complexity. On the one hand, the facts themselves have multiplied enormously. On the 
other hand the accepted standards of judgment have dissolved, so that he finds himself 
on an ocean of fact ‘plunged in a thick fog of details’ and ‘with few of the charts and lights’ 
for which he longs. 
It is undoubtedly difficult to achieve, at the present moment, “a truthful, comprehensive, 
and intelligent account of the day’s events in a context which gives them meaning,” as 
proposed by the Commission on Freedom of the Press chaired by Hutchins (1969, p. 21). A 
current problem for the media is to correspond to those issues that are relevant to citizens, 
to truly satisfy the need for information they feel. There is an obvious need for an orientation 
to restore confidence in a global universe, in which differences have been sharpened and in 
which, as a consequence, disenchantment spreads, which represents a fertile ground for 
nationalism and populisms of different origins. 
The new challenge also extends to the academic sphere, and in particular to those who 
deal with communication. It seems as if in this time of post-truth and fake news everything 
was oriented to produce an effect or to establish an agenda, as if communication consisted in 
imposing its own agenda. More than sixty years ago, Gerbner warned that the communication 
theory could “find a scientific orientation based on values or continue to be the elaboration of 
manipulation techniques” (1956). Many centuries before, Aristotle wrote that all 
communication was political communication (López-Escobar & Martín Algarra, 2013), 
because he understood that the polis was built through genuine communication. Calling the 
issuance of messages to manipulate citizens ‘political communication’ seems to be a 
euphemism. 
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